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Administrative Adjudication of Air
Pollution Disputes: The Work of Air
Pollution Control District Hearing
Boards in California
Kenneth A. Manaster*
Introduction
Control of air pollution from stationary sources in California is primarily a function of local government.' In contrast, state government,
principally through the California Air Resources Board (ARB), is responsible for control of air pollution from most types of motor vehicles.'
The ARB also plays an important oversight and support role in stationary source control efforts, but the major responsibility is still with
the local air pollution control districts.'
© 1984 by Kenneth A. Manaster
Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara. Adjunct Professor of Law, University
of California, Hastings College of the Law. Chairman, Hearing Board, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District (AQMD). A.B. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Harvard University.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author personally and are not
official statements of the Hearing Board of the Bay Area AQMD. Portions of this
Article earlier appeared in papers presented by the author before the Air Pollution
Enforcement Symposia of the California Air Resources Board.
' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39002 (West 1979); see Simmons & Cutting, A
Many Layered Wonder: Nonvehicular Air Pollution Control Law in California, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 109, 125 (1974).
2 CAL HEALTH & SAFErY CODE §§ 39002, 39500 (West 1979); see also Western
Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Orange County APCD, 14 Cal. 3d 411, 534 P.2d 1329, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 249 (1975); J. KRiER & E. URsIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERiENCE wrrH MOTOR VEHICLE Am PoLLUtIoN
1940-1975 (1977).
CALIFORNIA AIR REsouRcEs BOARD, REPORT TO THE LEGisLATuRE ON Am
PoLLuTION CONTROL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS XX (April 1982) [hereafter ARB
REPORT]; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42362 (West 1979) (ARB authority to
revoke or modify variance granted by APCD if variance does not require compliance as
expeditiously as practicable); see also Stauffer Chem. Co. v. ARB, 128 Cal. App. 3d
789, 792, 180 Cal. Rptr. 550, 552 (1st Dist. 1982); Simmons & Cutting, supra note 1,
at 124-25, 141.
*
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The work of the forty-five air pollution control districts (APCD's)
that encompass California has been discussed extensively in the legal
literature, with almost all of the discussion emphasizing either the
rulemaking powers or the enforcement tools available to the APCD's.
This Article examines the adjudicatory authority vested in the APCD's,
for most of the significant conflicts between regulatory authorities and
stationary sources of air pollution in California are brought within the
administrative adjudication process. More specifically, this Article explains some fundamental aspects of the work of the hearing boards in
each California APCD and offers some perspectives and suggestions
that may assist government and private attorneys, enforcement personnel, industry technical experts, and other witnesses in presenting their
cases more effectively before these boards.
The first area of hearing board work to be explored will be applications for variances. This is the type of case that the boards face most
frequently.' The basic elements of hearing board work appear most
See ARB REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-2; Chass & Feldman, Tearsfor John Doe, 27
S. CAL. L. REV. 349 (1954); Chernow, Implementing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles: The Duty to Achieve the Impossible, 4 ECoLOGy L.Q. 537 (1975); Crawford, The
Bay Area Air Quality Management District: Air Pollution Control at the Local Level,
19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 619 (1979); Kennedy, The Legal Aspects of Air Pollution
Control with ParticularReference to the County of Los Angeles, 27 S. CAL. L. REV.
373 (1954); Simmons & Cutting, supra note 1; Stevens, Air Pollutionand the Federal
System: Responses to Felt Necessities, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (1971); Willick &
Windle, Rule Enforcement by the Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District, 3
EcoL y L.Q. 507 (1973); Comment, California Legislation on Air Contaminant
Emissions from Stationary Sources, 58 CAUF. L. REV. 1474 (1970); Comment, Regional Control of Air and Water Pollution in the San FranciscoBay Area, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 702 (1967); Note, California Code of Civil Procedure Section 731(a): Denial
of Private Injunctive Relief from Air Pollution, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1401, 1403-06
(1971); Comment, Stationary Source Air Pollution Control in Calfornia:A Proposed
JurisdictionalReorganization, 26 UCLA L. REV. 893 (1979) [hereafter Comment,
Stationary Source].
A total of 657 variances and 3 abatement orders were granted during the
period from July 1, 1980 through June 30, 1981. This number reflects
only the variance orders received by the ARB....
Out of the 660 [sic] variances granted, the [South Coast] AQMD issued
410 orders or 62 percent of the total (which seems reasonable since the
SCAQMD has the most sources), the San Joaquin County APCD issued
59 or 9 percent, [San Diego County] APCD and [Kern County] APCD
issued 7 percent each, and the [Bay Area] AQMD issued 6 percent of the
total. Fifteen of the 45 districts issued 1 percent or less of the total number
of variances in the State and 25 districts, or 56 percent of the districts,
issued no variances during the noted time period.
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clearly in variance proceedings. The second category is abatement order
requests, another well-established aspect of hearing board activities. As
will be shown, abatement cases usually share many of the characteristics and objectives of variance cases. The third category is a relatively
new and growing area, the resolution of permit disputes. These disputes include such controversies as requests by APCD officials for revocation of operating permits and appeals by individual companies and
others from APCD action on construction and operating permit requests. As with abatement cases, many of the observations regarding
variances are relevant to the procedures and goals of permit cases.
I.

PRELIMINARY FACTS AND APPROACHES

Before analyzing the three types of cases, some basic facts about
hearing boards should be outlined. First, each APCD has a hearing
board consisting of five members appointed by the district board of directors to staggered, three year terms." Second, at least three of the
members are required by statute to bring some relevant expertise to the
work. One member must be admitted to practice law in California, one
must be a registered professional engineer, and one must be from the
medical profession with specialization in the fields of environmental
medicine, community medicine, or occupational or toxicologic medicine.
The other two members are designated as "public members.'" Third,
the members are "part-timers" on the hearing board; that is, they have
other work or endeavors to which they probably devote much more
time each week than they spend on hearing board matters."
These three facts are significant for attorneys appearing before hearing boards. In each case counsel deals with an assortment of from three
to five board members who pose a number of possible problems. One
problem arises from counsel's inability to know just how much or how
little relevant background each member brings to a given case. At one
extreme is the actual conflict of interest situation, in which the board
member has been an employee or a consultant for the particular air
ARB REPORT, supra note 3, at IV-47, IV-60; see also Walker, The Air Pollution
Control Hearing Board - Functionsand Jurisdictions,27 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 400
(1954).
6 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40800, 40804 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984).
' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40801 (West 1979).

' Some hearing boards with light caseloads meet infrequently, no more than a handful of times each year. Others meet on one or more days each week. The South Coast
District Hearing Board members "typically hear perhaps 30 to 40 cases a month meeting three times each week." South Coast AQMD, Air Quality Digest 2 (July 1983).
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pollution source. That member should not participate in that case at
all; the member knows too much.' At the other extreme is the member
who has no relevant expertise to bring to bear on the particular kind of
source at issue. There are many gradations of interest and expertise
between these two extremes.
The challenge faced by the attorney for a polluter, for APCD staff,
or for an interested intervenor such as a local citizens group 0 is to
communicate effectively with these people who presumably are prepared to hear a case, but who have varying degrees of pertinent background. To meet this challenge, counsel should attempt to become familiar with the areas of interest and knowledge of board members as
demonstrated in prior proceedings. It can be very helpful to the attorney and client, as well as to the board itself, if counsel is ready to
respond to specific areas of likely concern of the board members, such
as the medical member's concern about the possibly toxic character of
emissions or the lawyer's concern about whether proper notice to the
public has been given regarding pending proceedings."
Conversely, if the attorney overlooks the fact that some board members know far more about technical issues than others, a presentation of
proof and argument at a technically sophisticated level may go over the
heads of the lay people on the board. Counsel might hope to rely upon
the board members themselves to take the initiative to point out their
own areas of ignorance, but this is a somewhat embarrassing thing to
expect a member to do when counsel, witnesses, and at least some fellow board members seem perfectly at ease with the technical jargon.
Counsel is thus challenged to present evidence and argument at levels
of sophistication suitable to the various abilities and interests of the
board. Counsel should not talk down to hearing board members, nor
should counsel waste everyone's time by talking over the members'
heads.
One constructive approach to preparing for hearing board proceedings is to gather advance information about the board's practices and
predispositions, perhaps by observing current proceedings, reading earlier decisions, 2 or inquiring of attorneys with experience before the
See, e.g.,

CAL.

Gov'T

CODE

§§

87100-87103, 87302(c) (West 1976 & Supp.

1984).
,O See BAY AREA AQMD, HEARING BOARD RULES § 2.7 ("Application for Intervention") [hereafter BAY AREA RULES].
" The public notice requirements are set forth in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 40823-40827 (West 1979).
" "A hearing board shall announce its decision in writing." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 40860 (West 1979). See generally R. FELLMETH & R. FOLSOM,
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particular hearing board. The goal is to know the board, to develop an
almost intuitive awareness of the types of issues with which the various
members are prepared to deal comfortably. On those issues, counsel can
proceed at a fairly rapid pace, and the board members will appreciate
the effort. On the other, unfamiliar issues, counsel must not hesitate to
offer fundamental, explanatory information. The parties also should
not hesitate to inquire at suitable moments during a hearing whether
some of the board members would like to hear such basic testimony and
whether any aspects of the case are unclear. The offer will be appreciated, especially by those lacking experience in technical areas such as
chemistry and engineering that frequently arise in air pollution cases.
Visual aids such as photographs of equipment or line diagrams of
processes may often be very informative for the board.
In considering these observations and the analysis that follows, it
should be kept in mind that the procedures followed by hearing boards
in some APCD's are rather formal, in the nature of judicial proceedings.' Others are informal, and some rely heavily upon written documentation of parties' positions rather than upon live testimony."' Although most of the discussion in this Article pertains to the formal
approach, which the statute apparently contemplates, the differences
among various hearing boards should not obscure the more general
points. The discussion of the major purposes and basic procedural aspects of hearing board cases should be helpful to attorneys and parties
working in any of the APCD's. The objectives of this type of administrative adjudication are probably achieved equally well through both
the formal and informal approaches."
CALIFORNIA REGULATORY LAW AND PRACTICE § 139 (1981).
" See, e.g., BAY AREA RULES, supra note 10, §§ 5.1-.22; see also South Coast
AQMD, Air Quality Digest 3 (July 1983) ("the Hearing Board takes testimony in
courtroom-like proceedings"); SAN DIEGO CouNTY APCD, HEARING BOARD RULES
AND REGULATIONS, Rule 18 ("Order of Proceedings"); Currie, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 27, 60 (1981) ("It seems clear that in general a quasi-judicial
hearing is a helpful means of ascertaining the facts relevant to the grant or denial of a
variance.").
",See, e.g., POLICY & PROCEDURE FOR THE HEARING BOARD OF THE SANTA BARBARA COUNTY APCD, para. 4 (Feb. 8, 1980) ("The applicant and the Air Pollution
Control District shall submit to the Clerk for the District, at least five days prior to the
hearing date, all documentary evidence and support materials which they propose to
introduce at the hearing.").
" Although the hearing boards are structured as essentially independent, adjudicatory arms of the APCD's, there is some risk that a board can become overly reliant
upon the opinions and preferences of APCD staff personnel, who regularly appear
before the board and who, in contrast to the board members, work full-time on air

HeinOnline -- 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1121 1983-1984

University of California, Davis

1122

II.

A.

[Vol. 17:1117

VARIANCES

General Characteristicsof Applications for Variances

The main statutory provisions governing variance cases are sections
42350 through 42364 of the Health and Safety Code. The first of these
sections states: "Any person may apply to the hearing board for a variance from Section 41701 or from the rules and regulations of the district." 16 The vast majority of variance applications are filed by private
industrial, agricultural, and commercial operations seeking temporary
protection from district rules and regulations. In some instances, the
statutory ban on excess visible emissions section 41701's
"Ringelmann 2" limitation" - will also be a subject of the applicant's
request for variance protection. In addition to private applicants, variances are occasionally sought by public agencies, such as municipal
sewage treatment plants, electric utilities, federal military'" and research installations, and hospitals. Procedurally there is nothing different in the treatment of these cases, other than regulatory provisions that
may provide for reduced or exempted filing fees.' 9
One statutory requirement from which a variance may not be
pollution matters. As one commentary has also implied, the fact that the district governing board makes APCD policy and appoints hearing board members may also constrain some members to be wary of great departures from the views of that board and
staff. Willick & Windle, supra note 4, at 531-32.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42350 (West 1979).
I? The easiest, oldest, and most economical method of measuring opacity is
with the naked eye aided by the Ringelmann Chart. The Ringelmann
Chart is a graph containing various shades of grey coinciding with a dark
plume of particulate emissions of an idicated [sic] denseness or opacity.
. . . The state standard of Ringelmann 2 or forty percent opacity applies
in those districts that have not enacted a more stringent regulation.
Crawford, supra note 4, at 624-25 (footnotes omitted). The constitutionality of §
41701's predecessor was declared in People v. Plywood Mfrs., 137 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955).
," See California ex rel. ARB v. Department of the Navy, 431 F. Supp. 1271, 127576 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
" The statutory authorization for variance fees requirements is CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 42364 (West 1979). Also, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40500
(West Supp. 1984) and § 40510 (West 1979) authorize an addition to variance filing
fees for the South Coast AQMD. The addition has been described as "an excess emissions fee based on the total weight of emissions discharged during the variance period
in excess of that allowed by air quality rules." South Coast AQMD, Air Quality Digest 8 (July 1983); see also B. Frantz, Excess Emissions Fees Program for SCAQMD
Hearing Board (paper presented at California ARB, Air Pollution Enforcement Symposium, Apr. 29, 1981) (copy on file with author).
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granted is section 41700, the statutory nuisance provision."0 This important limitation on hearing board power must be kept in mind in
every case in which there is some evidence of nuisance-type effects on
persons living, working, or traveling in the vicinity of the- source in
question. Neither the applicant nor APCD personnel involved in the
case should attempt to persuade the hearing board to grant a variance
when operation under the variance probably would create a nuisance.
Similarly, the legislature has forbidden the granting of variances
from district permit schemes, pursuant to section 42300, with particular
respect to permits to build, erect, alter, or replace.2" This prohibition,
however, does not preclude the granting of a variance from the requirement of a permit to operate. Apparently the legislative belief was that
equities sufficient to justify granting a variance might be proved by a
source which has already been given authorization to construct new facilities or alterations, but that the variance device would be inappropriate absent the initial permit to build. The latter type of case presumably can be handled by means of an appeal from a denial of a requested
permit to build in the first place.
In the ordinary nonnuisance case, whether the applicant is a private
or public entity, the goal of the application is the same: to buy time for
the source to be able to continue operating more or less normally despite being in violation of a district regulation or the statutory
Ringelmann provision. Ordinarily the applicant will urge that it needs
this period of time to complete corrective action to solve the problem.
Given this objective, it might be thought that variance applicants are
trying to accomplish something improper, to obtain some privilege contrary to the objectives of air pollution control. Such a perspective would
be erroneous; if the statutory criteria can be satisfied, the applicant is
entitled to a variance. It might even be apt at that point to describe the
[N]o person shall discharge from any source whatsoever such quantities of
air contaminants or other materials which cause injury, detriment, nuisance, or annoyance to any considerable number of persons or to the public, or which endanger the comfort, repose, health, or safety of any such
persons or the public, or which cause, or have a natural tendency to cause,
injury or damage to business or property.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41700 (West 1979). The constitutionality of this
section was upheld when challenged as void for vagueness in People v. General Motors
Corp., 116 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 172 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1980). Section 42353, which
discusses findings and conditions in variance orders, expressly provides that "no variance shall be granted if the operation, under the variance, will result in a violation of
Section 41700." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42353 (West 1979).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42350 (West 1979).
20
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variance as a matter of right.2" The legislature designed this procedure
for the benefit of air pollution sources that have good reasons for needing time to continue operating without being subject to enforcement
penalties. If an applicant can demonstrate such a reason, it deserves a
variance.
B.

The Questions to be Answered

Since the application for variance is ordinarily submitted by the pollution source operator,2 3 which is in the best position to explain its need
for relief, the burden of proof should rest upon the applicant. In the
formal, trial-type procedures followed by some hearing boards, the applicant thus presents its argument and evidence first, followed by the
APCD. The general question that the parties should attempt to address, and that the hearing board must answer, is simply this: Does the
proof presented by the applicant and the district in the case demonstrate that the applicant satisfies the statutory criteria for variance protection? These statutory criteria are found in section 42352. There are
three criteria, to be discussed in the order in which they appear in the
law.
(a) That the petitionerfor a variance is, or will be, in violation of
Section 41701 or of any rule, regulation, or order of the district.2 5 This
requirement is usually the easiest to prove and least debatable of the
Cf Currie, supra note 13, at 60-61:
[Ilf a pollution statute creates a substantive right in the polluter to obtain
relief upon meeting prescribed criteria, contemporary Supreme Court
opinions strongly suggest that the polluter has a property interest within
the protection of the due process clause, and that he is entitled to a quasijudicial hearing if his allegations state a claim on which relief can be
granted.
See also D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
200 (1975) (variances from zoning ordinances discretionary, but when standards clearly
met, may be a right to variance).
23 Occasionally an application is presented by a third party, such as a contractor
constructing new sewage treatment facilities for a public agency, or a manufacturer of a
product on behalf of retail vendors subject to APCD regulations regarding sales of the
product. See State Indus., Inc., No. 2890 (Hearing Board, South Coast AQMD; Findings and Decision entered Mar. 23, 1983); BSP Division Envirotech, No. 613 (Hearing
Board, Bay Area AQMD; Order Extending Variance entered Mar. 1, 1979).
24 Customary legal considerations also lead to this conclusion. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 500 (West 1966); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 255-62 (2d ed.
1980).
2 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42352(a) (West 1979); see also CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 41703 (West Supp. 1984).
22
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three. Ordinarily the applicant has received notification from the
APCD that it is in violation, or it may have become aware on its own
initiative that it is not currently in full compliance or will not be in the
foreseeable future. If the hearing board is not shown that the violation
requirement is met, no variance can be granted because none is needed.
The critical responsibility of the parties on this issue is to make sure
that the hearing board is properly advised as to exactly which provisions of the district's rules and regulations are violated. If this is not
done, it becomes extremely difficult for the board, if it sees fit to grant
the requested variance, to draw up a decision and an order which specifically limit the coverage of the variance to the applicable provisions.
With the increasingly complex and occasionally overlapping regulatory
provisions on the books, it is important that all parties to these cases,
and the board as well, understand exactly what the violations are.
Often the APCD staff and its attorney are in the best position to bring
out this information. This is especially true when the applicant is generally unfamiliar with district powers and is either unrepresented by an
attorney or represented by an attorney unfamiliar with APCD
regulations.
(b) That, due to conditions beyond the reasonable control of the petitioner, requiring compliance would result in either (1) an arbitraryor
unreasonable taking of property, or (2) the practical closing and elimination of a lawful business."6 This second requirement is often the
most difficult issue the hearing board must resolve. It is best interpreted
as having two areas of emphasis.
First, the board must determine whether requiring present compliance would impose a serious hardship on the applicant. This hardship
is addressed by the twin phrases "an arbitrary or unreasonable taking
of property" and "the practical closing and elimination of a lawful business." In order to evaluate the alleged hardship, the board is likely to
be interested in evidence on such questions as the nature of the applicant's goods or services, the extent to which others could provide those
goods or services if the applicant temporarily could not do so, the size
of the applicant's labor force and payroll, the amount of the applicant's
capital investment in the facility in question, and the ability of the applicant to stay in business even if compliance would require a period of
curtailed operations. 7 On the basis of this kind of testimony, the board
& SAFETY CODE § 42352(b) (West 1979).
Santa Fe Enameling & Metal Finishing Co., No. 2536-1, at 3 (Hearing Board,
South Coast AQMD; Findings and Decision granting variance entered Mar. 9, 1983)
26

CAL. HEALTH

27
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can determine whether compliance would be a hardship. A variance
cannot be granted unless such hardship is proven.
The view of hardship just suggested is much broader than a strict
reading of the twin phrases on this point might suggest. The strict
view, allowing variance relief only when something akin to an unconstitutional taking of property can be shown, would drastically narrow
the availability of variance relief. Hearing boards throughout California, however, have held the broad interpretation to be more consistent
with an orderly and fair regulatory scheme for air pollution control. "8
Hardship alone is not enough to satisfy this second statutory requirement. There is also the area of emphasis indicated by the words "due to
conditions beyond the reasonable control of the petitioner." This language requires the hearing board to make a finding of some minimum
level of past diligence on the applicant's part before variance protection
is justified. 2' If the applicant's present and predicted violations, and the
hardship compliance would impose, are due to conditions beyond its
reasonable control, a variance is warranted. If, on the other hand, it
appears that the applicant's predicament is one which has been within
("Failure to grant the variance would harm petitioner in that petitioner would lose
approximately 40 percent of its sales which would ultimately result in the closing of the
business which has taken the family 22 years to establish.").
28 See, e.g., FMC Corp., No. 1166, at 5-6 (Hearing Board, Bay Area AQMD; Order Granting Variance filed Jan. 5, 1984) ("Applicant would be forced to shut down a
substantial portion of its . . . [flacilities . . . , pending the development of suitable
complying replacement coatings. Approximately 4100 of Applicant's 5800 employees
would be laid off as a consequence of such a plant shutdown."); National Can Corp.,
No. 1080, at 3-4 (Hearing Board, Bay Area AQMD; Order Granting Variance filed
July 7, 1983) ("Requiring compliance with the District's rules at this time would force
the Applicant to curtail operation. . . on the weekends, curtailing a substantial portion
of its operations and subjecting the Applicant to loss of income, loss of customer goodwill and possibly to contractual liability."); Exxon Co., U.S.A., No. 842, at 4 (Hearing
Board, Bay Area AQMD; Order Granting Emergency Variance filed May 27, 1982)
("Such a shutdown would also cause Applicant to lose a substantial amount of business
and deprive Applicant's customers of the products they need and utilize . . . ."); see
also Western Can Co., No. 1148, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay Area AQMD; Order
Granting Variance filed Oct. 27, 1983) ("[W]ithout the relief prayed for, Applicant
would be forced to shut down permanently after providing jobs and serving the community for some 64 years."). A systematic analysis of this type of equitable discretion may
be found in Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the
Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163,
182-92.
2 "It has been the practice of the [Los Angeles County] Hearing Board to grant
variance petitions when the petitioner is exercising 'due diligence' in bringing his operation into compliance . . . ." Willick & Windle, supra note 4, at 529.
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its reasonable control and which diligence on its part could have
avoided, no variance should be granted. 0 The legislature has not offered variance protection for negligent, dilatory pollution sources.
Occasionally hearing boards have heard a contrary argument about
the meaning of the "reasonable control" language. They have been
urged to find that, regardless of an applicant's past history of inattention to its air pollution control obligations, variance relief is justified if
immediate abatement of the pollution now is beyond the source's reasonable control. Similarly, they have been urged to find diligence when
the source addressed the emissions problem soon after the APCD cited
it for being in violation or did a source test which showed a violation,
even though the regulation had been in force long before then. These
kinds of arguments have been rejected." To have accepted them would
make variance relief available to a polluter who chooses to wait until
the APCD's enforcement efforts focus on it. If the polluter cannot then
immediately comply, because of such obstacles as control equipment
construction and installation delays, it would have a period of exemption from enforcement. This is not what the legislature has told the
hearing boards to allow.
This area of inquiry can be immeasurably aided by the readiness of
district inspectors, engineers, and lawyers to provide certain information. They should carefully gather together for presentation in the
hearing all district records about the past history of the source's activities, especially its history of contact with APCD enforcement staff
which should have alerted it to its responsibilities. It is very important
that the attorneys for both the applicant and the APCD make clear to
the hearing board precisely when the pertinent regulations came into
force or were amended into the version at issue in the case. It may be
very striking to the board, for example, that the applicant has done
nothing at all to control its emissions over a five year period, but if the
applicable regulation was promulgated only one year ago and went into
,0 City of Davis, No. 83-002, at 1 (Hearing Board, Yolo-Solano APCD; Order Denying Variance entered July 26, 1983) ("The petitioner has failed to correct equipment
deficiencies under a previous variance."); James W. Crawford, No. 2545, at 3 (Hearing Board, South Coast AQMD; Findings and Decision denying variance entered Jan.
5, 1982) ("Petitioner has been aware of District Rules and Regulations and has made
no effort to come into compliance.").
" To understand the rejection of these arguments, it may be helpful to think of the
metaphor of the purported marathon runner who only enters the race on its last leg.
That runner should not be declared a winner. See Doubts Rise on Woman's Feat; 'I
Ran Race', She Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1980, at B15, col. I (Rosie Ruiz victory in
Boston Marathon questioned).

HeinOnline -- 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1127 1983-1984

1128

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 17:1117

effect six months ago, then the applicant's position on the diligence
question is not as bad as it might at first appear.
District legal and enforcement staff personnel in variance cases have
an obligation to aim their efforts toward the quickest possible cleanup,
while also having some compassion for the applicant that really is in a
bind "due to conditions beyond its reasonable control." On the other
hand, variances are not free passes for irresponsible polluters which
have the notion that hearing boards serve merely the convenient function of restraining zealous enforcement personnel who are making the
polluters' lives difficult. The responsibilities of lawyers for the APCD
to engage in thorough cross-examination on the "reasonable control"
issue thus are considerable, and attorneys for variance applicants
should alert and prepare their witnesses for this important area of
inquiry.
Presumably the quickest cleanup efforts by irresponsible pollution
sources will be forthcoming if they must face the ongoing prospect of
the district's usual enforcement machinery being used against them. 2
Fortunately it is now seldom that highly negligent or irresponsible
sources do come before hearing boards; nevertheless, the statute requires the boards to examine whether an applicant's hardship is essentially self-imposed and therefore not to be relieved, or whether it is due
to circumstances beyond its reasonable control and therefore deserving
of official mitigation.
(c) That such closing or taking would be without a corresponding
benefit in reducing air contaminants.33 This third factor calls the hearing board's attention to the actual character and level of the applicant's
emissions. One way of interpreting this provision is to say that it calls
for a balancing of the hardship to the applicant if compliance is required against the benefit to the public if the pollution is curtailed by
compliance. This is the classic type of balancing of competing interests
that courts have performed in nuisance cases for centuries.3 4 It is also
32 The

principal enforcement and penalties provisions are found in

&
SAFETY CODE §§ 42400-42400.5, 42402-42406 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984). See, e.g.,
People v. A-1 Roofing Serv., 87 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 151 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1978). To
the extent that the risks and burdens imposed by the enforcement machinery are small
- either because the courts hesitate to impose full penalties or because enforcement
personnel do not press vigorously for penalties in court or for substantial settlements the incentives for cleanup efforts will be diminished. See generally Crawford, supra
note 4, at 630 (enforcement procedures).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42352(c) (West 1979).
" See generally W. PitossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 580-82, 596-602
(4th ed. 1971); W. RoDGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100-02,
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very much the same task that section 42354 requires the hearing board
to perform in drawing up the terms and conditions of variance orders.
Under that section the boar4. "shall exercise a wide discretion in weighing the equities involved and the advantages to the residents of the district from the reduction of air contaminants and the disadvantages to
any otherwise lawful business, occupation, or activity involved, result'
ing from requiring compliance with such variance requirements."35
Since most of the job of evaluating hardship takes place under the
second statutory criterion, as discussed above, this third criterion largely
adds the mandate that the board take a hard look at the actual air
pollution involved in the case. The board needs answers to questions
such as these: Exactly what are the pollutants in question? In what
quantities are they being emitted? Over what time periods are they
being emitted? What kind of neighborhood is the source located in and
what effects of the emissions are experienced there? What do we know
about the health effects of these emissions? Even apart from health effects, are these emissions annoying or offensive, either by themselves or
in combination with emissions from other sources in the area?" What
is the nature of air quality in the area already? Will operations under a
variance make the air quality any better or worse than it already has
been?
The answers to these and other related questions must come largely
from the methodical presentation of detailed testimony by district witnesses and the applicant's own technical personnel and consultants. In
recent years some of the information has been presented in connection
with the federal Clean Air Act requirement that a finding be made of
noninterference with the attainment and maintenance of national ambient air quality standards for a variance to qualify as an acceptable compliance schedule constituting a revision of the State Implementation
Plan." Whatever the specific federal requirements may be, as interpreted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, it does
seem that fundamentally the same type of information is called for if
the hearing board is to have a basis for answering the third statutory
question.
110-11, 744 (1977).
& SAFETY CODE § 42354 (West 1979).
As noted above, such emissions might well constitute a violation of § 41700, thus
barring any variance relief. See supra text accompanying note 20.
" See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Enforcement Div., Region IX, Variances, Variance Orders, Waivers, and Conditional Permits as Compliance Schedule Revisions to the SIP
(July 1979) (copy on file with author).
"
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C. Orders
Assuming the hearing board can answer these questions in favor of
the applicant for a variance, the remaining challenge to the board is to
"prescribe requirements other than those imposed by statute or by any
rule, regulation, or order of the district board, not more onerous, applicable to plants and equipment operated by specified industry or business or for specified activity, or to the operations of individual persons."38 This provision in essence empowers the board to devise tailormade requirements for individual sources entitled to variance protection. As noted earlier, section 24354 gives the board considerable discretion to evaluate equities on both sides of the case in drawing up
these requirements."
Both the attorneys for a variance applicant and those representing
district staff have important roles to play in helping the hearing board
develop effective variance orders in keeping with the statutory purposes.
First, both parties should have an opinion as to the time needed for
solving the polluter's compliance problem. Because of its expertise and
basic enforcement responsibilities, the district staff almost always
should have a position on whether a variance is justified. Even in those
occasional instances when it does not, the staff still should be able to
provide the board with its expert opinion on the suitable duration of
variance relief. The district's air pollution engineers and testing experts, as well as the applicant's personnel, consultants, and equipment
suppliers, should be able to offer opinions as to the amount of time
needed to obtain, install, and bring into effective operation any control
measures the source will use to come into compliance. Equally desirable is the staff's opinion as to whether the proposed control approach is
likely to work. The hearing board should not have to rely solely upon
the applicant's witnesses for this information.
A second major area in which both parties, and especially the district
staff, should advise the board of their opinions is operating conditions
during the variance period. What emission limitation should the source
observe during the variance? Should certain alterations in production
processes, schedules, or equipment be required? Exactly what schedule
of increments of progress should the applicant be required to follow to
come into compliance by the end of the variance period? These and
other questions must be resolved by the board, and the district's expertise is essential if the job is to be done well. It should be noted that the
"

"

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42353 (West 1979).
See supra text accompanying note 34.
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statute explicitly requires any variance for a period exceeding one year
to have "a schedule of increments of progress specifying a final compliance date." '
An additional type of condition, the requirement of a performance
bond pursuant to section 42355, should also be considered in appropriate cases. A bond provides an added incentive to stay on schedule toward compliance, especially when there is some reason to doubt the
future diligence of the applicant. It has been used occasionally by hearing boards for this purpose."1
In short, close attention must be paid to the specific terms of the
variance order. For the particular source covered by the order, the
terms of the variance are the 'law. Since the ordinary regulations do not
apply, the specific regulatory provisions involved in the case must be
brought out with complete clarity."' District enforcement personnel will
have to treat the terms of the variance as the law applicable to the'
variance holder for the period of the variance. These personnel cannot
do their jobs, and the source cannot know what is expected of it, unless
the variance conditions are clear and complete. The statutory responsibility for drawing up such orders ultimately rests with the hearing
boards themselves,4 but they cannot do it well without the active assisCAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42358(b) (West 1979).
" Davis Walker Corp., No. 520 (Hearing Board, Bay Area APCD; Order Granting
Variance entered July 7, 1975); Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., No. 509 (Hearing Board,
Bay Area APCD; Order Granting Variance, Adopting a Compliance Schedule, and
Requiring Bond entered Dec. 23, 1974); see J. Abercrombie, Performance Bonds (paper presented at California ARB, Air Pollution Enforcement Symposium, Apr. 25,
1980) (copy on file with author).
In an abatement case, one hearing board has required the respondent to post "a bond
or other financial security. . . in the sum of two million dollars ($2,000,000) to ensure
performance of the terms of the Order for Abatement as modified and to ensure availability of funds to operate and maintain air pollution control measures after closure of
the landfill." Operating Indus., Inc., No. 2121-2, at 13 (Hearing Board, South Coast
AQMD; First Modification of Order for Abatement entered Aug. 2, 1983). The statutory authority for such a provision other than in a variance order is unclear.
42 See supra text accompanying note 27.
" See supra note 12. The actual procedures employed for the drafting of orders vary
widely among hearing boards, and even a single board will alter its practices among
various cases. See, e.g., POLICY & PROCEDURE FOR THE HEARING BOARD OF THE
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY APCD, para. 2:
Final rulings of the Hearing Board shall be drafted and approved for signature by chairperson or designee by the Air Pollution Control District
and Counsel within ten days after the hearing. Counsel for applicant and
for District shall submit a proposed order, drafted at or right after a hearing to the Hearing Board chairperson or designee.
"
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tance of the parties and their lawyers during the course of the hearings.
D.

Interim Variances

As is true for most other aspects of air pollution control in California, the statutory provisions on variances recently have become more
complex. One refinement introduced is the interim variance device. Section 42351(a) declares that an applicant for a variance "who desires to
commence or continue operation pending the decision of the hearing
board on the application" 4 may apply for an interim variance. Section
42351(b) then states that an interim variance may be granted "for good
causes stated in the order" and may not last longer than either the date
of decision on the regular variance application or ninety days, whichever occurs first.
This preliminary period of variance protection is granted on the basis of an abbreviated, initial inquiry into "good causes." "Good causes"
seems to contemplate a preliminary examination of the likelihood that
the applicant will be able to make a good case for the regular variance
protection it seeks when the full hearing on that request is held.4" A
court engages in an analogous inquiry when a preliminary injunction is
sought, focusing upon the likelihood that the applicant ultimately will
prevail on the merits and upon the relative hardships to the parties and
6
the public if preliminary relief is or is not granted.'
In some districts, the hearing board gives greatest attention in this
initial inquiry to the reasonable control issue, trying to ascertain preliminarily whether the applicant has been diligent in discovering its
noncompliance with district regulations and taking steps to eliminate
the problems. If such a showing of diligence is made, the requested
interim variance can be granted. At the later hearing on the regular
application the applicant's proposed corrective measures and all other
aspects of the case can be explored in detail. Often the interim variance
hearing provides a good opportunity for the board to identify questions
the parties should research further so as to make a thorough presentation at the full hearing.
Despite the straightforward purpose of interim variance hearings,
"

§ 42351 (West 1979).
See Ray Nisson Warehouse, No. 83-003 (Hearing Board, Yolo-Solano APCD;
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

Order Granting Interim Variance entered July 26, 1983); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., No.

83-001 (Hearing Board, Yolo-Solano APCD; Order Granting Interim Variance entered Apr. 12, 1983).
41 See generally Leshy, Interlocutory Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases: A
Primerfor the Practitioner,6 EcoLOGY L.Q. 639 (1977).
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there are problems associated with them."7 One difficulty is the scheduling of interim variance hearings. Because hearing boards are not in
session full time, this may be a difficult matter."8 In districts with a
population less than 500,000, an interim variance hearing may be held
by a designated single hearing board member. 9 This further suggests
that an interim variance hearing is to be abbreviated and preliminary
in character. Where this expedient is not available, however, a question
remains as to how long a gap between an interim variance hearing and
a regular variance hearing justifies having the separate interim variance
hearing.
If the board's calendar is so crowded that it cannot even schedule an
interim variance hearing until a date very close to the regular variance
hearing, it is not efficient to hold a separate, initial hearing, especially
because the hearing board would be within its authority later to combine the two hearings into one. 0 It then could issue a regular variance
order, making it retroactive to the date of original filing of the application." That would give the applicant the ultimate legal protection it
'"

One of the most prevalent, but least serious, problems is that the phrase "interim

variance" in

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 42351 (West 1979), like the phrase

"emergency variance" in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42359.5 (West Supp.
1984), has made it necessary to come up with a name for other kinds of variances not
so clearly labelled by the legislature. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40825 (West
1979), one of the provisions on notice requirements, identifies variances that are "to be
in effect for a period of not more than 90 days"; these have come to be known as
"short" or "short term variances." The longer variances - the main area of variance
work - are variously called "full," "regular," or "ordinary" variances. These confusing labels are not a serious problem, for usually the persons involved in a case agree on
what they are talking about.
48 Cf Willick & Windle, supra note 4, at 531 n.137.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40824(c) (West 1979).
10 "Petitions for interim variances may not be heard by the Hearing Board if received less than fifteen days prior to the next hearing, except for good cause shown."
POLICY & PROCEDURE FOR THE HEARING BOARD OF THE SANTA BARBARA COUNTY

APCD, para. 1. The Hearing Board of the Bay Area AQMD ordinarily will combine
the interim and regular variance hearings in a case if calendar constraints make it
impossible to set the interim variance request more than 30 days ahead of the regular
variance hearing. This attempts to minimize unnecessary duplication of hearings, recognizing that it is difficult to avoid repetition of information when the same case is
heard in these two stages.
11 It has been argued before the Bay Area Hearing Board that variance relief can be
granted retroactively to a date prior to the date of filing of the application. Presumably
the effect of such an approach would be to invalidate district notices of violation issued
to a source even prior to the filing. Formerly a statutory provision allowed a Bay Area
AQMD enforcement proceeding in court to be removed to the Hearing Board. If the
board determined that a variance would have been justified, then counsel for the district
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wishes, although it would not have given the applicant the interim
peace of mind that the statute seems to contemplate. District regulations or discretionary enforcement policies may provide some such reassurance to an applicant by suspending or deferring some enforcement
measures while a variance application is pending.5"
Attorneys in an interim variance hearing should assist the hearing
board in keeping the focus of the proceedings limited to a preliminary
survey of issues, and the diligence issue in particular. Some applicants
have a difficult time comprehending this two-step process, which is understandable since they are interested in getting as much variance protection as they can as quickly as possible. It is therefore often incumbent upon the APCD's attorney to assist the applicant and the hearing
board in keeping the interim variance hearings directed toward the useful, but limited protection the legislature wishes the interim variance
device to provide.
E. Emergency Variances
For some years, section 42359 has contained a vague reference to the
possibility of dispensing with ordinary notice and hearing requirements
for variances "in the case of an emergency." 5 3 More recently section
42359.5 has expanded hearing board powers in all districts to deal with
emergencies.5 4 That section now refers to "an emergency variance"
which may be granted by a designated single member of a board "without notice and hearing." Such an emergency variance may be issued for
"good cause, including, but not limited to, a breakdown condition.""
The maximum length of an emergency variance, however, is thirty
days.
was required to dismiss the court proceeding. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
24369.1 (West 1975), repealed by Act of Sept. 22, 1975, ch. 957, § 10, 1975 Cal. Stat.
2138, 2141; see Simmons & Cutting, supra note 1, at 121-22. The repeal of that provision by the legislature strongly implies that hearing boards do not now have the authority to take any action in variance cases to determine the merits of violations antedating
the source's submission to hearing board jurisdiction.
,2 BAY AREA AQMD, REGULATION 1-402 ("Status of Violation Notices During
Variance Proceedings").
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42359 (West 1979) was added in 1975. Act of
Sept. 22, 1975, ch. 957, § 12, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2138, 2186.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42359.5 (West Supp. 1984) was added in 1976,
Act of Sept. 6, 1976, ch. 773, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stat. 1814, but originally only applied to
the San Diego County APCD. It was amended in 1979 to apply to all districts. Act of
July 10, 1979, ch. 239, § 5, 1979 Cal. Stat. 494, 495.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42359.5 (West Supp. 1984).
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Under these provisions districts now have great flexibility in creating
as efficient and simple a process as possible for dealing with emergencies, especially breakdowns. One approach is to allow an applicant to
"file" its request for emergency relief by telephone. 6 An immediate series of telephone calls involving the applicant, district staff, and a designated hearing board member can produce a decision on the request
within a period as brief as a few hours. This procedure has been used
extensively in recent years in the many cases involving requests for
variance relief by gasoline service station operators experiencing difficulties with components of vapor recovery systems and subject to stringent, immediate sanctions in the absence of variance relief.5 7 One advantage of this approach is that it allows for the possibility of imposing
immediate conditions upon a source while the emergency is still
occurring.
In other cases, in which a swift decision is not critical or the necessary information cannot be obtained from district staff and the applicant to enable the designated member to make an informed decision
immediately, hearing board procedures may allow for an initial telephone filing, but a deferred decision. Within a few weeks of the initial
request, the full board can review the matter and hold a hearing just as
it would in any short term variance case. 8 The whole incident then can
be thoroughly and calmly examined by the board, and retroactive variance relief can be granted if warranted.
Although the emergency variance provisions constitute a marked departure from the formal notice and hearing requirements that traditionally have characterized hearing board work, they are a useful supplement to the main mode of administrative adjudication the boards
usually follow. The legislature, in effect, has told the hearing boards to
stand ready at all times to listen and respond to the needs of air polluters encountering sudden noncompliance circumstances.
56 BAY AREA RULES, supra note 10, § 2.4 ("Emergency Variances"); SAN DIEGO
COUNTY APCD, HEARING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, Rules 10(b), 14 (June
12, 1980).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41960.2 (West Supp. 1984). The pivotal importance of the hearing board clerk or other administrative personnel in facilitating and
keeping a record of the telephone deliberations and decisions should not be
underestimated.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40501.1 (West Supp. 1984), added in 1981,
authorizes single-member hearings in the South Coast AQMD in emergency, interim,
or short-term variance cases upon the stipulation of the parties. Because of the great
frequency with which that hearing board meets, it would seem that much of its emergency variance work could be handled in prompt hearings.
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General Observations

This analysis has sought to delineate the principal features of variance cases and the kinds of information attorneys must include in
presentations before hearing boards. Certainly all of the testimony and
argument of the parties in the variance process must be directed to
helping the board resolve the issues the statute requires it to address
and to helping it draw up an effective, intelligible, and enforceable order if a variance is justified. The key word is "relevance." All aspects
of the applicant's and the APCD's cases should be relevant to one or
more of the statutory elements the hearing board must resolve.
Obviously considerable preparation by the attorneys is necessary if
the presentations are to be efficient and helpful. Discovery devices are
available to counsel by virtue of hearing board rules or the state statutory provisions for administrative adjudication. 9 Such advance discovery, or informal exchanges of information between the parties, should
be used to facilitate early, thorough preparation of the parties'
positions.
The hearing itself certainly should not be the first, or even the principal, forum for the APCD staff and lawyers to find out about the
applicant's problems and proposed solutions. Informal consultations,
and formal discovery when necessary, should be pursued by both the
district's and the applicant's counsel, so that when hearings are held the
information presented is comprehensive, clear, and above all relevant to
the job the statute requires the hearing boards to do in variance cases.
III.

ABATEMENT ORDERS

An order for abatement is the strongest administrative sanction available to an air pollution control district. It has been described by an
official of the Santa Barbara APCD as "the ultimate tool available to
5' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40807 (West 1979) authorizes hearing boards
to adopt rules for the conduct of hearings. The rules are to be consistent "so far as

practicable" with the rules for administrative adjudication in the state Administrative
Procedure Act, ch. 867, 1945 Cal. Stat. 1626 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV'T

§§ 11500-11528 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984)). Discovery rules have been adopted
by some districts. See BAY AREA RULES, supra note 10, §§ 6.1-.2; SAN DIEGO
COUNTY APCD, HEARING BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, Rule 21. In 1981 a
superior court ruling upheld hearing board authority to develop rules allowing broader
discovery than is permitted under the Administrative Procedure Act. Port of Redwood
City v. Hearing Bd., No. 780189 (Super. Ct., San Francisco; Judgment, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered Sept. 4, 1981).
CODE

HeinOnline -- 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1136 1983-1984

1984]

Air Pollution Adjudication

1137

an air pollution control district for effecting compliance,"6 by an official of the Ventura County APCD as something that "would probably
be used . . . only if other, less onerous, enforcement procedures had
failed to correct an air pollution problem," 6 ' and by an official of the
South Coast AQMD as a measure to be pursued "when the standard
enforcement procedures, i.e. notices of violation and misdemeanor penalties, prove inadequate to achieve expeditious compliance."6 In short,
abatement orders are generally viewed as a remedy of last resort - the
heavy artillery to be brought out when lesser weapons have failed.
Although theoretically available against violators of any regulation
"prohibiting or limiting the discharge of air contaminants,"63 abatement
orders in many districts are most frequently sought against violators of
the statutory public nuisance provision6 or of basic requirements of
district permit systems.6 ' There are a variety of practical and strategic
reasons for this tendency, but the overriding fact is that the sources
brought before hearing boards in abatement order cases are generally
those that district staffs believe are operating farthest from the required
procedures and emission regulations. These most troublesome of pol60 J.Buchert, Tools Available to Hearing Boards - Abatement Orders, at 1 (Paper
presented at California ARB, Air Pollution Enforcement Symposium, Apr. 29, 1981)
(on file with author). Mr. Buchert is Chairman of the Hearing Board of the Santa
Barbara County APCD.
" Letter to author from J. Smithson, Chairperson, Ventura County APCD Hearing
Board (Mar. 17, 1982) (on file with author).
6 Letter to author from P. Greenwald, Deputy District Counsel, South Coast
AQMD (Apr. 6, 1982) (on file with author).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42451 (West 1979):
On its own motion, or upon motion of the district board or the air pollution control officer, the hearing board may, after notice and a hearing,
issue an order for abatement whenever it finds that any person is in violation of Section 41700 or 41701 or of any order, rule, or regulation prohibiting or limiting the discharge of air contaminants into the air.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42452 (West 1979):
The order for abatement shall be framed in the manner of a writ of injunction requiring the respondent to refrain from a particular act. The
order may be conditional and require a respondent to refrain from a particular act unless certain conditions are met. The order shall not have the
effect of permitting a variance unless all the conditions for a variance,
including limitation of time, are met.
"4 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41700 (West 1979).
6 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42300 (West 1979). A good example of a dispute over the application of the terms of an APCD permit system and its exemptions is
Julius Goldman's Egg City v. APCD, 116 Cal. App. 3d 741, 172 Cal. Rptr. 301 (2d
Dist. 1981).
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luters face the prospect of abatement orders.
A.

Burdens and Penalties

Although abatement orders can be constructive in nature, and in
some respects similar to variances, one difference from variances is that
the APCD staff chooses to initiate abatement proceedings."' This creates time-consuming and perhaps costly obligations for the source to
respond to the charges against it. This hardship imposed by the process
itself is one of the onerous aspects of abatement cases; it is also one
reason why they are not brought lightly by APCD personnel. Another
critical feature is the severity of the penalties for violation of an abatement order issued by a hearing board.67 These include prompt enforcement of the abatement order by judicial injunction, 8 civil penalties of
up to $6000 for each day of violation of an abatement order,69 and
probably criminal sanctions for commission of a misdemeanor. 0
B.

A Variance By Any Other Name . . .

A great deal of what has been said about the purposes and processes
of variance cases is fully applicable to cases in which orders for abatement are sought. This should come as no surprise, for the issues in both
types of cases are fundamentally the same. The primary difference is
that in a variance case the applicant is trying to prove its good faith and
diligence in eliminating its violations, whereas in an abatement case the
" On March 3, 1983 a bill was introduced in the California Assembly that, inter
alia, would expand the terms of § 42451 to make it possible for "any aggrieved person" to make a motion before a hearing board for the issuance of an order for abatement. A.B. 1638, Cal. Legis., 1983-1984 Reg. Sess. (introduced by Assemblyman Margolin). This bill died in committee, and when reintroduced on February 16, 1984 did
not contain this broad administrative standing provision. A.B. 3298, Cal. Legis., 19831984 Reg. Sess. (introduced by Assemblyman Margolin). The relationship between
APCD regulatory programs and private nuisance remedies is discussed in Venuto v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 358-60 (1st
Dist. 1971).
" Although § 42450 authorizes a district governing board to issue abatement orders,
it would be extraordinary for this legislative body to exercise such adjudicatory authority. The hearing board route under § 42451 is much more likely to be followed.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42453-42454 (West 1979); cf. Application of
Circosta, 219 Cal. App. 2d 777, 33 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1st Dist. 1963); Comment, Regional Control of Air and Water Pollution in the San FranciscoBay Area, 55 CAIF.
L. REv. 702, 706 n.43 (1967).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42401, 42403-42405 (West 1979 & Supp.
1984).
70 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 42400 (West Supp. 1984).
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APCD staff is trying to prove that the particular source will unjustifiably continue to pollute unless restrained by a hearing board order for
abatement.
The inquiry in either type of case nonetheless is very much the same.
It examines the nature of the violations, the burden that compliance
would impose on the source, the diligence or lack of it which has characterized the operation, and the actual air pollution effects. This inquiry occurs in an abatement case even though the statutory provision
on abatement orders is so succinct as to be virtually silent regarding the
pertinent issues in an abatement proceeding." As with the hearing
boards' rejection of a strict reading of the hardship criterion in variance
cases, 2 the boards have taken a broad, pragmatic interpretation of the
relevant factors in an abatement hearing.
The correspondence between abatement and variance cases is highlighted by the statutory allowance for the possibility that a conditional
abatement order may be entered which will have "the effect of permitting a variance."" This effect is allowed only if all the conditions for a
variance are met. The basic statutory findings in variance cases thus
would have to be satisfied as well.7
C. Proof
The statute only requires proof of violation as a basis for abatement.75 This means that considerable attention will be focused upon the
severity of the violation. This is true also because district resources are
most likely to be brought to bear in an abatement proceeding against "a
persistent and unjustifiable polluter." 6 This focus upon the duration
and magnitude of noncompliance is especially apt when the alleged violation pertains to section 41700, the statutory nuisance prohibition. In
these instances, much of the APCD's case will rest upon the testimony
of citizen witnesses, which must be clearly presented."
One very effective technique which has been employed in nuisance
" See supra note 63.
72 See supra text accompanying note 27.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42452 (West 1979) (quoted supra note 63).
Such a dual order was issued in Union Oil Co., No. 269-60 (Hearing Board, South
Coast AQMD; Findings and Decision entered Mar. 15, 1983).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
76

§ 42352 (West 1979).
§ 42451 (West 1979) (quoted supra note 63).

Crawford, supra note 4, at 633.

" See Manaster, Early Thoughts on Prosecuting Polluters, 2 ECOLoGY L.Q. 471,

489 (1972) ("The testimony of such witnesses should be limited to their actual observations and the identifiable effects of the pollution on themselves and their property.").
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abatement cases to present the clearest picture of the situation is the use
of a carefully marked map showing the locations of the alleged violator,
of all major air pollution sources in the vicinity, and of complaining
citizens. As each witness testifies, his or her location at the time of
alleged discomfort can be pinpointed in relation both to the respondent
and to the other sources in the area. Often the respondent's assertion
will be that the other local sources are at least as likely to be the cause
of the problem as is respondent. The use of this kind of visual aid helps
to make the attempted proof of the violations, and the attempted refutation of the charges, an efficient and clear process.
D.

Terms and Conditions

Another distinctive aspect of abatement cases is the complexity of the
orders entered if a violation is found. Although the statute seems to
authorize abatement simply if a violation is proven, 7 8 the statutory references to "conditional" abatement orders confirm the logical suspicion
that other, variance-type issues are inherent in these cases as well. Presumably it will be the rare case in which the APCD seeks a flat injunctive order requiring the respondent to shut down operations entirely."
In the usual situation, the district will wish to have an order for abatement which is, as the statute says, "framed in the manner of a writ of
injunction requiring the respondent to refrain from a particular act
' 80
• . .unless certain conditions are met.
In many instances hearing boards have issued conditional abatement
orders which require corrective action to be taken on a specified schedule. The schedule is in addition to the command that the violations
immediately cease." The Bay Area Board has included provisions stating that conformity with the corrective measures in the order would be
deemed to constitute compliance with the abatement directive itself."
" See supra text accompanying note 75.
9

As a general rule it may be said that mandatory relief is always preferable
to negative injunctive relief because the effect of the former is to continue
the activity, with its benefits to society, while reducing the polluting by-

products, whereas the latter does eliminate the pollution but may well
eliminate other useful products or services as well.
Manaster, supra note 77, at 478-79.
8o

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 42452 (West 1979).

a'Richard L. Jones, No. 915 (Hearing Board, San Diego County APCD; Order of
Abatement entered Sept. 24, 1981).
82 See, e.g., Imperial West Chem. Co., No. 826 (Hearing Board, Bay Area AQMD;
Conditional Order for Abatement filed May 13, 1982). See generally Crawford, supra
note 4, at 634-35.
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Such conformity, however, would not have the effect of a variance, and
the source would still remain subject to ordinary enforcement penalties
for violations of district regulations. The Bay Area Hearing Board has
also, in at least one case, entered an abatement order mandating the
complete cessation of the polluting activities, with the agreement of the
respondent and the district that the operation would be shut down. 3 In
the San Diego and South Coast districts the practice generally seems to
be to declare the corrective measures as an alternative to closing the
source's operations. 4
Finally, in instances in which proposed abatement orders have been
presented to the Bay Area Board with the consent of all parties to the
case, that board has taken the position that it has the responsibility to
make sure it is entering an effective order. This view is bolstered by
section 42451's direction that an abatement order can be issued on the
hearing board's "own motion."85 This suggests that even if the parties
do not believe an abatement order is warranted, the hearing board may
nonetheless issue one on terms it finds justified by the evidence. Even
agreed orders are thus subject to scrutiny in a hearing, and to redrafting and modification by the board members themselves, before the or86

ders can be entered.

83 Crown Tire Co., No. 579 (Hearing Board, Bay Area APCD; Consent Order for
Abatement entered Mar. 10, 1977).
84 Code Welding & Fabrication Co., No. 925 (Hearing Board, San Diego County
APCD; Order of Abatement entered Dec. 3, 1981) ("[An Order of Abatement shall be
issued enjoining Code Welding and Fabrication Company, Inc. from continuing to op-

erate abrasive blasting equipment

. . .

unless the following conditions are met . .

.");

William G. Seel, No. 917 (Hearing Board, San Diego County APCD; Order of Abatement entered Oct. 22, 1981) ("[Tlhe Hearing Board . . . issues an Order of Abatement
enjoining Respondent from continuing to operate this facility unless the increments of
progress and conditions set out in Exhibit A attached are met."); see also South Coast
AQMD, No. 2684 (Hearing Board, South Coast AQMD; Findings and Decision for
Order for Abatement entered Nov. 17, 1981) ("The Hearing Board hereby issues an
Order for Abatement of the emissions from Respondent, Los Angeles County Mechanical Department's non-complying gasoline dispensing facilities. Said facilities shall comply with Rule 461 on and after October 23, 1981, or cease operations.").
85 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42451 (West 1979).
" See Operating Indus., Inc., No. 2121-1 (Hearing Board, South Coast AQMD;
Findings and Decision for Order for Abatement entered May 18, 1983). The Board in
that case entered its order on the basis of a stipulation of the parties, but with the
modification of one deadline to a date earlier than the parties had agreed.
This raises the possibility that a hearing board can enter an order that no party to
the case finds to its liking. On two occasions this occurred in the Bay Area AQMD,
and one of the parties challenged the order in court pursuant to CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 40864 (West 1979). The Hearing Board's order was defended with
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E. Approaches to Abatement Proceedings
Attorneys representing an APCD in an abatement case should make
clear to the hearing board just what type of conditional abatement order they are seeking. If they are not clear about the relevant possibilities, and their preferences among them, then the hearing board can
only conclude that they are seeking that rare creature, an unconditional
abatement order. Technically, APCD attorneys are entitled to present
proof of violations and to leave to the hearing board the entire question
of a suitable remedy. This would not seem to be the most efficient or

responsible course.
Attorneys representing respondents must carefully appraise the prospects of entirely avoiding the imposition of any form of abatement order
on their clients. If those prospects are dim,87 counsel's attention should
shift to the delineation of constructive terms and conditions that the
client can live with while promptly solving its compliance problems.
Ideally counsel should seek to minimize the exposure of the source to
enforcement penalties by obtaining an order that has "the effect of permitting a variance.""8 One way to promote this result is to file a separate application for variance and to seek its consolidation for hearing
with the accusation. This may tend to shift the inquiry onto more positive, solution-oriented ground.
A well-written conditional abatement order can be an exceptionally
effective tool for compelling a previously severe offender to come
promptly into compliance. The full range of expertise and creativity of
the APCD, the respondent, and their respective lawyers should be
made available to the hearing board in each case in the attempt to construct this tool.
the assistance of outside counsel chosen by the Hearing Board with approval and funding provided by the district board of directors under previously established procedures.
In the absence of this ultimate, albeit rare, resort to outside representation, hearing
board orders could amount to little more than a rubber stamp for district staff positions.
See Pacific Steel Casting Co. v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area AQMD, No. 569839-4
(Super Ct., Alameda County; Judgment Granting Motion for Remand to Hearing
Board entered May 24, 1983); Port of Redwood City v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area
AQMD, No. 780189 (Super. Ct., San Francisco; Judgment, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered Sept. 4, 1981); see also Glidden-Durkee Div. of SCM Corp. v.
Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area APCD, No. 729-951 (Super. Ct., San Francisco; Petition
for Writ of Mandate filed Oct. 28, 1977).
" See supra text accompanying notes 60-62, 76.
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42452 (West 1979); see supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
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PERMIT DISPUTES

The newest area of hearing board work is the resolution of disputes
over permits. Section 42300 authorizes every APCD to establish a permit system broadly covering the construction and operation of any
equipment or contrivance "which may cause the issuance of air contaminants." 9 The statute identifies three basic situations in which a
district's hearing board may be called upon to resolve a permit dispute.
Section 42302 allows a permit applicant whose request has been denied
by APCD staff to have the hearing board determine "whether or not
the permit was properly denied."9 Section 42306 allows a permittee
whose permit has been suspended by the district staff to have the board
determine "whether or not the permit was properly suspended." 9' Section 42307 authorizes an air pollution control officer" to request the
hearing board to determine "whether a permit should be revoked"
when the permittee has been found to be violating district
requirements. 3

A recently added, fourth avenue for permit disputes to come to hearing boards is section 40713. It allows appeals from APCD refusals to
approve reductions in emissions for "banking" and later use as offsets
against future emission increases.9" In addition to these statutory provisions for bringing permit disputes before hearing boards, at least one
district's permit system regulations explicitly allow for "any other person dissatisfied with the decision" on a permit application to "appeal to
the District Hearing Board for an order modifying or reversing that
decision." 95
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42300 (West 1979).
90 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42302 (West 1979); see
"

People v. A-1 Roofing
Serv., 87 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 14, 151 Cal. Rptr. 522, 529-30 (1978); Durochrome
Prods., Inc., No. 2143 (Hearing Board, South Coast AQMD; Findings and Decision
entered Mar. 27, 1979).
9' CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42306 (West 1979); see Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co. v. Lunche, 367 F. Supp. 106 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
92 The air pollution control officer, who is selected by the district's governing board,
is the chief executive of an APCD. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40750-40753
(West 1979).
93 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42307 (West 1979). The most prominent example of such a proceeding is Standard Oil Co. v. Feldstein, 105 Cal. App. 3d 590, 164

Cal. Rptr. 403 (1st Dist. 1980).

9' Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., No. 1062 (Hearing Board, Bay Area AQMD; Notice of
Appeal filed Nov. 10, 1982).

91 BAY AREA AQMD, REGULATION 2, RULE 1, § 410. The legality of this provision has been upheld in three superior court rulings. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hearing
Bd. of the Bay Area AQMD, No. 235477 (Super. Ct., Contra Costa County; Applica-
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It should be evident from these provisions that permit disputes are
not subject to the more specific types of statutory standards that govern
the decision of variance cases. The issue in permit cases is more baldly
stated in terms of whether a permit was "properly" denied or suspended, or whether a permit "should be revoked" if the permit holder
is violating some applicable requirement. This lean statement of the
standards hearing boards are to apply in permit disputes necessarily
invites the boards to exercise considerable discretion in approaching
these controversies.
As a practical matter, in most instances the inquiry will be whether
the district staff has made a fair, reasonable interpretation of the applicable legal requirements in its action or finding regarding a permit applicant or permittee. Unless a hearing board can determine that the
staff's action was clearly wrong, the board's usual function should be to
determine whether the staff view in the permit dispute falls within a
sensible interpretation of the language and purpose of the applicable
regulations or other requirements. The traditional legal presumption of
the regularity and correctness of administrative action9 6 first means in
this context that the burden of proof in a permit dispute should be on
the party challenging the district staff's action or finding.97 It also
means that the hearing board should not lightly disagree with the
staff's determinations. A hearing board in permit cases is operating in a
fashion analogous to the role of an appellate court reviewing administrative agency action. This is in contrast to the board's function in variance or abatement cases, where the better analogy is to the work of trial
courts hearing matters in the first instance.98 In short, the hearing
board should not readily substitute its judgment in permit cases for that
of the expert, full-time staff of the APCD. This does not mean, howtion for Temporary Restraining Order denied May 26, 1982); Port of Redwood City v.
Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area AQMD, No. 780189 (Super. Ct., San Francisco; Judgment, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered Sept. 4, 1981); Kaiser Cement
Corp. v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area AQMD, No. 441380 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara
County; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed Aug. 19, 1981).
6 CAL. EvID. CODE § 664 (West 1966) ("It is presumed that official duty has been
regularly performed."); see also Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Auth., 40 Cal. 2d
317, 329, 253 P.2d 659, 667 (1953); People v. A-1 Roofing Serv., 87 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 1, 11, 151 Cal. Rptr. 522, 527 (1978).
"9 See CAL. EvnD. CODE § 660 (West 1966); see also People v. A-1 Roofing Serv.,
87 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 11, 151 Cal. Rptr. 522, 527 (1978).
" It appears that at an earlier stage of statutory development, variances could be
granted by county APCD hearing boards or the courts. See Comment, California Legislation on Air Contaminant Emissions from Stationary Sources, 58 CALIF. L. REV.
1474, 1491 (1970).
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ever, that the independent oversight and review function of the hearing
board should be forfeited.
Permit cases tend to be unusually technical, both scientifically and
legally. The customary variance case emphasis on issues such as economic hardship, nuisance effects, and reasonable control is replaced in
permit cases with much more sophisticated and time-consuming inquiries into specific manufacturing processes, pollution control technology
approaches, future emissions predictions, "baseline" emissions histories
and formulas,9 9 ambient air quality levels, permit review procedures,
and the legislative history of individual regulatory specifications.'"0
Many of the permit disputes relate to APCD regulations which are
in the process of being changed, especially regulations for the review of
new major sources of air pollution. In the Bay Area district this has
been true in almost all the permit cases the hearing board has faced in
recent years.' 0' Clearly a hearing board in such instances is being called
upon to clarify some of the serious uncertainties that accompany the
evolution and implementation of any new, substantial environmental
regulation. This function is particularly sensitive when dealing with
new source review provisions, which have great impact on economic
development in California.
Because permit cases seem to be individually distinctive, it is difficult
to generalize about suggested approaches to the parties' presentations of
their positions. Many of the observations offered regarding variance
cases also apply here,' ' but the greatest challenge in permit cases is to
" An exhaustive analysis of the kinds of problems encountered in determining a past
baseline against which to compare future emissions may be found in Standard Oil Co.
v. Feldstein, 105 Cal. App. 3d 590, 164 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1st Dist. 1980).
"I Complex issues of interpretation of the purposes and operation of permit schemes
can also arise in abatement cases involving permit violations, as illustrated in Julius

Goldman's Egg City v. APCD, 116 Cal. App. 3d 741, 172 Cal. Rptr. 301 (2d Dist.

1981).
"' See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Feldstein, 105 Cal. App. 3d 590, 164 Cal. Rptr.
403 (1st Dist. 1980); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area AQMD,
No. 494183 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara County; Peremptory Writ of Mandamus issued
June 11, 1982); Citizens for a Better Environment, No. 837 (Hearing Board, Bay Area
AQMD; Order Denying Appeal entered Mar. 3, 1983) (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. Richmond Lube Oil Project); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., No. 1062 (Hearing Board, Bay Area
AQMD; Notice of Appeal filed Nov. 10, 1982); Citizens for a Better Environment, No.
675 (Hearing Board, Bay Area AQMD; Order to Revoke Authority to Construct entered May 1, 1980; Order Modifying Authority to Construct After Rehearing entered
June 19, 1980) (Wickland Oil Co. petroleum products distribution terminal); Dow
Chem. Co., No. 567 (Hearing Board, Bay Area APCD; Request for Hearing Following Improper Denial of Permit filed Aug. 20, 1976).
,0,
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 39-40, 42.
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make sure that the hearing board members - again regardless of their
various degrees of technical background knowledge - understand the
technical evidence being presented. Counsel for the parties in such a
case must strive to translate their clients' detailed and expert familiarity
with the facts, and counsel's own interpretations of the law, into clear
explanations of the points they wish the hearing board to grasp and act
upon.
CONCLUSION

This survey of the objectives and principal characteristics of hearing
board cases is intended to help lawyers and other persons involved in
such cases to have a clearer perspective as they prepare to go before
hearing boards and as they actually make their presentations there.
Greatest attention has been given to the variance process because that is
the heart of hearing board work and because it best exemplifies the
inquiry into equitable considerations that characterizes most cases
before these boards. As has been shown, however, the three types of
cases that come before hearing boards often do have different emphases.
One way of summarizing these emphases is to say that in variance
cases the issue of the applicant's diligence and good faith in seeking to
comply frequently dominates the proceedings. In abatement cases, in
contrast, the nature and extent of the violations often seem to be of
most critical concern. Finally, in permit cases technical issues of interpretation of the law and of alternative technological approaches usually
control. In all three areas, however, and regardless of these varying
emphases, the underlying goal of administrative adjudication by the
hearing boards is the same. It is to reduce air pollution as quickly, as
greatly, and as fairly as possible, taking into account the needs and
hardships of those whose lawful, productive activities contribute air
pollution to the environment.
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